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ABSTRACT
Dalam situasi tak stabil saat ini konsep postmodernitas dan
multikulturalisme tak lagi banyak berguna. Pluralitas dan
fragmentasi hanya menarik saat kondisi sosial stabil dan aman,
saat keragaman kultural tampil sebagai aneka pilihan. Yang
dibutuhkan kini adalah rasa keutuhan baru Namun berbagai.
jalur pencarian keutuhan saat ini macam fundamentalisme,
romantisisme, universalisme dan " ternyata juga taksplitting"
cukup realistis menghadapi kompleksitas tuntutan jaman.
Artikel ini mengusulkan konsep "modernitas baru", yang
mengandung prinsip reflektivitas, kesadaran atas kaburnya
batas-batas, kemampuan menerima hibriditas, dan orientasi
kosmopolitan. Berdasarkan itu diusulkanlah konsep
kekatolikan baru, yakni kekatolikan yang kosmopolitan dan
tidak etnosentris; mengandung keutuhan iman yang
menampilkan kepenuhan kemanusiaan dan mempromosikan
rekonsiliasi; serta mampu menciptakan masyarakat komunikasi
yang mengelola kompleksitas dunia manusia secara lebih
konstruktif.
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Is Postmodernity Over? Living in an Unstable World
When people in the future look back on the decades that surrounded
the turn of the twenty-first century and of the third millennium, what are
they likely to notice most? Surely one thing will be the contrast between the
beginning of the 1990s and the beginning of the subsequent decade. In the
early 1990s, the world was still celebrating the astonishing collapse of
Communism in Europe and the dramatic end of the Cold War period. No
one could really imagine what would take the place of the bipolar relations
that had marked the second half of the twentieth century, after the
cataclysm of two world wars in the first half. Some, like Francis Fukuyama,
opined that this meant the ultimate triumph of democratic capitalism, and
perhaps the ushering in of what Immanuel Kant had dreamt of at the end
of a century two hundred years earliera "perpetual peace." Others along the
same line hoped that worldwide disorder might finally be coming to an end.
It did not take long, however, for a very different picture to emerge.
The Cold War standoff had kept many local conflicts under control; only
those that served as proxies for the Big Power struggles were permitted to
come to the surface. Within a few years, Samuel Huntington was predicting
a "clash of civilizations," with a key fault line between the Christian West
and the world of Islam.
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Today, those voices that heralded the world as being a place of such
harmony and peace for the foreseeable future are silent. Hardly anyone
sees the beginnings now of a perpetual peace. Rather, observers point to
factors that portend badly for a peaceable future. To mention but one: the
high birth rates in many countries in the world are providing a supply of
unemployed young males for at least the next thirty years. This is the group
most likely to cause unrest and civil disorder.
But rather than engaging in a generalized apocalyptic doom, it is
important to try to look closely and carefully at what is happening today.
The intent of these lectures is to do that: to look at where we are in the world
today, to find adequate ways of interpreting what is happening, and to see
what resources in Christian faith and heritage might contribute to making
this world a better place to be, for ourselves and for those generations that
we hope will follow us.
In order to do this, I would like to devote this first lecture to the task of
describing where are some of the neuralgic points in our world todaythose
points that cause us concern or even outright distress. Responding to this
distress will then set the scene for the second and third lectures, which will
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take up themes of new ways of looking at these challenges, and the
resources of Christian faith to respond to them.
In order to fulfill that first aspiration, of looking at the world today, I
want to point to four major movements that have largely (but not
exclusively) begun in the last decade and a half that together are making the
world a turbulent and unstable place. I would like to treat them in more or
less in the order that they have come to our attention. They are:
globalization, increased migration, the resurgence of religion, and threats
of global terrorism. Having done that, I will turn to two of the principal
frameworks available for accounting for the phenomena, and at times the
consequences, of these movements. These frameworks are postmodernity
and multiculturalism, respectively. I will argue that both of these have
become increasingly unhelpful as analytic tools for reading the signs of our
times.
Globalization
The first is . This movement was already under way in 1990,globalization
but it took the end of state socialism in 1989 and 1991 to see how far it had
already progressed. New movements of globalization are initiated by
changes in communication and transportation. The information
technology developments that began in the 1980s became widely accessible
in the 1990s as first personal computers, and then the development of the
World Wide Web changed the way people were connected and
communicated. The consistent drop in air transportation costs did for
space what information technologies were doing for time. Hence, both
space and time have shrunk. When these were wedded to the economic
forces of capitalism, a single, worldwide set of interconnected markets
came into existence. For those who were inside this network, there was an
opportunity to make significant financial gain. But those on its fringes or
outside the network, however, often fell even further behind, losing the little
gain that had been made in the 1960s and 1970s. This has been affecting not
only the historically poor countries, but also the working poor in the
societies most directly benefiting from globalization. To be sure, at a
macro-level, globalization was lifting the giant populations in India and
especially China statistically to new levels of prosperity, but it is often those
losing out within those societies who have felt the keenest pinch.
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Globalization creates a great deal of turbulence and instability. It is a
rough ride for many, struggling to hold on as market forces and competition
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force us all to continue to lurch ahead. In the early 1990s, globalization's
virtues were being sung in many quarters. Today, there is a great deal more
caution. The language of its inevitability is fading, and parallels to other
periods of globalizationand especially among the Great Powers in Europe
leading up to the 1914 Warare beginning to emerge. A crisis could arise that
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would make trading partners pull back within their borders, and send the
dizzying juggernaut into a tailspin.
A second voice being raised in recent years about globalization is that
of the World Social Forum, with its slogan "Another world is possible."
First seen as an anarchic alternative to the Davos Forum and the World
Trade Organization, it is gradually taking on more contours of trying to
imagine alternative and more humane approaches to the worse
depredations of globalization.
For those who are caught up in its thrall, however, the breakneck pace
that staying up with globalization demands has been taking a greater human
toll on personal relationships, societies, and the institutions within those
societies. In a recent study done in the United States, arguably the epicentre
of the globalization frenzy, Dr. Peter Whybrow of the University of
California at Los Angeles describes what he calls the "American mania," of
people caught up in the globalization whirlwind, constantly striving for
more possessions and higher status even as it ruins their personal
relationships and their happiness.
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Migration
The second movement is . Migration is, of course, as old asmigration
human history. But the migration of the last two decades or so has brought
some distinctive features into the mix. The nineteenth-century migrations
to North America, Australia and New Zealand were largely out of Europe.
The relative inexpensive possibilities of air transportation have now created
migration from Asia, Africa, and Latin America, as well as inner migration
from Eastern Europe to countries in the West. Migration is no longer solely
to the Western world; internal migration in all of the continents is currently
underway. The combination of "push" factors such as poverty and war, and
the "pull" factors of opportunities for a better life have created a
pluralization of our societies such as we have never before seen. The United
Nations Development Programme's 2004 report on migration estimates
that at this point in history one out of every thirty-five persons on the planet
is a migrant. The number goes up to one out of twelve in Europe. London
5
claims to be the most multicultural city in the world now at least in terms of
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sheer numbers of immigrants and asylum seekers. Arguably, however,
Toronto and Vancouver have the highest percentages and variety of ethnic
backgrounds. Australia is the most multicultural country in the world
(again, based on percentage and its relatively low population level), followed
byCanada and theUnitedStates.
Because of the relatively inexpensive means of communication and
transportation now available, migrants do not break their times with their
homeland as they once had to do. Telephone cards, the Internet, and cheap
air tickets make it possible to send cash remittances home and to stay in
touch with loved ones. This has had an effect on how people are viewing
citizenship, something studied especially by Canadian sociologist Will
Kymlicka, and how they choose to align their allegiances between their
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country of birth and chosen country of employment.
These highly pluralized societies today are experiencing some
destabilizing tensions. For countries that have not seen themselves as end
points for migration (such as most of the countries of Europe),
xenophobic reactions have been taking place. Politicians in Denmark, The
Netherlands, Belgium, France, Germany, and Austria are beginning to claim
that their countries are "full," that is, cannot accept any more new faces.
Great Britaintraditionally more friendly to immigrationhas seen a turn in
recent months against asylum seekers and other foreigners. Countries once
known for their tolerance (such as the Netherlands) are drafting draconian
legislation to deal with what they see as a growing "problem." At the same
time, economists and demographers are pointing out in many of those
countries that they will have to continue to import even more foreigners if
they wish to maintain the national standard of living. The settled
population's birthrate is so low that the working population is not being
replaced. Consequently, future welfare (if kept to its current level) cannot
be paid for.
Recent political assassinations of public figures critical of immigration
in the Netherlands, and the increasingly shrill rhetoric of politicians and
advocates for greater immigration control have reached a harsh level in
some places. Two issues seem to underlie the debates. On the one hand, is
there a limit to how much social diversity a country can manage? There are
differing opinions about if there is such a threshold and where it might lie.
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In the views of many, democracy is the best form of social ordering found
thus far to accommodate high levels of diversity and plurality. But does
even democracy have limits? Second, a model of tolerance in which each
ethnic group keeps to itself is not providing any cohesion for the total
society. The disengaged tolerance of the Netherlands and Belgium is now
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coming apart. If tensions arise elsewhere, especially in societies with less
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of a history of tolerance, what will happen to those societies? These are
serious questions to be pondered, and as of yet no one has found
convincing answers to them.
The Resurgence of Religion
The third movement that is creating turbulence in the world is the
resurgence of religion. Up into the 1990s, western sociologists followed the
secularization hypothesis with which Max Weber had begun the twentieth
century. In this view, the Western Enlightenment was leading to a
desacralization of worldviews and of the world itself. First religion would
become a private matter, and then it would gradually disappear altogether.
That may still true for some societies (especially in the North Atlantic
region, and for Australia and New Zealand), but some of those same
sociologists who had predicted the forward march of secularization are
now noting that there has been a resurgence of interest in religion across the
world today. It manifests itself in a variety of different ways.
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Among the poor and the lower middle classes of Latin America and
Africa, Pentecostalism is sweeping through the landscape like wildfire. A
third of Guatemala is now Pentecostal. The single largest Christian
congregation in the world is in Seoul: Yoido Full Square Gospel Church has
more than six hundred thousand members, who fill its twenty-five thousand
seat sanctuary six times on Sundays. Some estimate that there will be more
Pentecostals and Charismatics in the world by 2025 than all the Orthodox
and mainline Protestants combined. Already there are an estimated 350-
500 million of them.
What is fuelling this rapid growth cannot be reduced to a single cause.
The move from the countryside into urban megalopolises, the
empowerment of women, the search for personal power in the midst of
being tossed to and fro by globalization, the quest for quick moneyall of
these contribute to this phenomenon. It has been especially since 1970
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that this rapid expansion has been seen. Whether it will continue at this
rapid pace through the next decades is anyone's guess, but at the moment it
shows no sign of abating. It is rapidly changing the face of Christianity
around the world today.
In Islam, the second largest religious body in the world after
Christianity, there has been a resurgence of faith as well. It, too, is fuelled by
diverse factors. Some point to the growing resentment of being humiliated
by the Christian West. The invasion and occupation of Afghanistan and
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Iraq have been the most recent causes for resentment, of Christian forces
humiliating Muslims in their own heartland. The support of Israel by the
United States to the neglect of the Palestinian people only confirms such
resentment in the minds of many. But there are other factors as well. Many
young, educated males in Muslim lands cannot find jobs. Since Western
technology has failed them, they turn to their faith. The sheer pace of
globalization, and the migration of Muslims out of majority-Muslim
countries into a Muslim diaspora have created an alienation that makes
people cling more to their faith. Movements of revival have been moving
through the Muslim world since the 1930s, but the recent developments of
globalization and migration have brought them to the attention of the rest
of the world. As recently as the early 1990s, French scholar Olivier Roy saw
worldwide Islam as too decentralized and too disorganized to make much
social difference. Today, he speaks more carefully about what he sees
happening.
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It has not been uncommon for Westerners to label all these revival
movements as Fundamentalism. There are, to be sure, fundamentalist
movements in Islam, but to paint all the movements with the same brush is
surely a misperception, since many Muslims view these movements as a
revival of faith in unstable times. There is the radicalization of some young
Muslims, particularly those who find themselves marginalized in their own
societies and in those countries of immigration where they are viewed with
suspicion. The case of the young Muslim who murdered Theo van Gogh in
Amsterdam in November, 2004 is a case in point. Born in the Netherlands
of Moroccan parents, he did well in school. But he took a yet unexplained
radical turn in the last two years before the event, aligning himself with an
extremist understanding of Islam.
There are two things about this religious resurgence that intersect
especially with the first two movements, namely, globalization and
migration. Religion and religious belief however construed now is a major
player on the stage of international relations. It can no longer be
discounted as merely the intrusion of private faith into the public forum. It
is one of the factors that must be calculated into relations between and
within states. The problem facing political figures is that all the currently
available models for understanding international relations are secular. The
only place for religion has been in humanitarian intervention by religious aid
agencies or the pleas of figures like Pope John Paul II. Political theorists are
scrambling to move beyond their secular bias to include what has been
called "the missing dimension of statecraft”.
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That religion is now implicated so often in political violence has
likewise given religion a prominent, if unwelcomed, place at the table. For
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secular agnostics, religion's role in violence simply confirms the oppressive
quality of religion in public life outlined by Feuerbach and Marx in the 19
th
century. How to account for the attraction of religious legitimation for
political violence as well as how to account for religion's role in peace-
building and reconciliationis still a matter of lively debate, something to
which we shall return in the final lecture. The point is that religion's
prominent role in public and international life is now so salient that it
cannot be ignored and to this point, has not been adequately accounted for
by either its supporters or its opponents. Because of its great intellectual
and emotive power, religion can add to both the stability of the world in the
decades ahead, and well as to its instability.
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The other feature is the relation of this resurgence of religion to
migration. Migrants are frequently more explicitly religious in their practice
in their new countries than they were in their homelands. When their new
country is a largely secularized one, their practice of religion may add
another level of tension and conflict between the newcomers and the
settled population.
This is being seen especially in Europe. African immigrants are
bringing with them their African Instituted Churches (AICs), marked by
enthusiastic worship, lively singing, focus on healing and the powers of the
Spirit. There are now six such congregations in Copenhagen whose Sunday
attendance is higher than the rest of the attendance combined in the entire
country. Such African-led congregations are also the largest such
congregations in Amsterdam, London, and Birmingham. They are
attracting non-immigrants as well. What this will mean for the face of
Christianity in a dechristianized Europe in a decade or two remains to be
seen. The migration of clergy from India, Nigeria, and the Philippines to
the United States is creating a situation where soon a third of all the Roman
Catholic clergy in that country will be foreign born. That appears already to
be the case among diocesan seminarians.
The other intersection between religion and migration is seen also in
Europe, where many of the newcomers are Muslims. Even as churches are
being closed, torn down, or converted to other uses, mosques and madrasas
are being built in the cities and towns of that continent. The opening of a
large mosque just north of Vatican City in Rome a few years ago has
become emblematic of that change in European society. In parts of secular
Europe, where there is even hostility toward religion, this is likely to make
things even more volatile, as the sharp contrast between the agnosticism of
the larger population and the religiosity of the newcomers portends
potential conflict.
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Global Terrorism
The fourth and final movement causing instability in the world is global
terrorism. The attacks in New York, on Bali, and in Madrid, as well as the
ongoing acts of terrorist violence in the Middle East, have introduced new
actors into international politics. Terrorists are not like the nation-states
who have been the principal actors on the world stage in war up to this time.
That is why a "war on terrorism" seems a bit of a misnomer. It is hard to
make war on a concept, and it is harder still to see if one is winning or losing,
and especially to see when such a war might be over. We are all aware,
however, of how it has been changing our lives. It adds costs and time to air
travel. It has had an impact on the flow of foreigners into our countries and
universities. It creates periodic patterns of social anxiety as terrorist alerts
are raised. It is most noticeable in societies that heretofore have felt
themselves to be internally secure. Now they share the chronic anxiety of
societies beset by violence and civil conflict.
Terrorist actions have multiple causes, stemming from resentment,
humiliation, hatred, and desperation. It is an unwelcome fact of the
twenty-first century, but unlikely to go away any time soon. Globalization,
migration, and religious resurgence all contribute to the environment that
spawns and sustains terrorand we hope that these three movements, too,
will contribute to its resolution. Global terrorism, in a word, is emblematic
of the instability with which we live in our world today.
Other factors could be named that are adding or will be adding soon to
this instability. A range of looming environmental crises is at the top of the
list. As disputes about whether there will be an impending environmental
disaster dwindle in the face of mounting evidence, this challenge will be
coming more and more to the fore. Its dynamics are somewhat different
from the four already mentioned, and it is for that reason I will not be going
into its implications in these lectures. It certainly deserves attention, but
best attention in its own right, not as part of a longer list. So I will be
concentrating on these four, since they are quite visible and at least in the
case of three of them religious faith has something to say about them.
This very long introduction to these lectures has been intended to set the
stage for looking at how we are responding to these challenges and how we
may have to change our frame of mind in order to do so more effectively.
So it is not simply a matter of economics (globalization) or demographics
(migration) or motivations for violence. Faith, I believe, has to account for
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itself in the midst of what is happening in the world, as well as begin to offer
some contributions to resolving the dilemmas that lie ahead. In this second
part of this first lecture, I want to look at two of the principal frameworks
that have been put forward to interpret this world of globalization,
migration, religious resurgence and global terrorism all of which are
contributing to shaping a different world and at least for the time being
creating a good deal of instability.
The two frameworks I want to examine here are that of postmodernity
and of multiculturalism. They have both developed as ways to help us deal
with the dynamics of diversity and difference we encounter in our
environments. And I would like to say at the outset that I think neither of
them is serving us very well in these matters any more.
Postmodernity
Postmodernity is a slippery concept. As the word itself connotes, it is
somehow after the "modern." It was first used in the art world as early as the
1920s. It came to be used in philosophy, the social sciences, literature and
finally theology in the last third of the twentieth century.
Within the wider domain of knowledge, Jean-François Lyotard's
report on knowledge to the government of Quebec in 1979 has served as a
kind of benchmark for the postmodern as an intellectual framework.
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Lyotard paints a picture of the increasing complexification and
differentiation of high modernity, an outgrowth of the European
Enlightenment. In that process of complexification, one discovers an
increasing plurality of phenomena and types of knowledge, with a
concomitant sense of the radically historical and the local. The universalist
pretensions of the French and German Enlightenments seem to be slipping
further and further away. One is struck in this complexity by the fact that
difference seems to press itself as a priority over similarity and sameness.
One is faced with unavoidable and irreducible difference. Metaphysics on
uncertain legs since the time of Immanuel Kant becomes an untenable
assertion. Indeed, as Lyotard pointed out most famously, the "grand
narratives" ( ), those shared narrative that are the basis of socialgrands reçits
cohesion and identity, slip further and further away. What we are left with is
fragments, disruptions, and discontinuities. Even the sense of the self
turns out to be illusory.
The work of French deconstruction in literature, led by figures such as
Paul De Man and Jacques Derrida, used these same insights to show
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instabilities in what has been otherwise perceived as coherent texts.
Paul Lakeland has been one of the most thoughtful figures in seeing
how postmodernity has worked itself out in theology. He has suggested
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that "postmodern" can refer to an intellectual theory, a set of social values,
or even a subculture where these values are lived out. In theology itself, the
postmodern turn has manifested itself in three principal ways. First of all, it
is an anti- or countermodern turn, questioning modernity as a sound basis
for doing theology at all. This is most evident in the Radical Orthodoxy
group around John Milbank and Catherine Pickstock, a largely Anglo-
American movement. Second, there is a belief that the postmodern is
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something radically new and thus separate and distinct from high modern
theology. The "Death of God" theologians in the United States in the
1960s and the work of figures such as Mark C. Taylor would fit into this
category. A third group would say that modernity is only failing us because
17
it has not been thoroughly implemented enough. Theologians following
the German philosopher and sociologist Jürgen Habermas would be in this
movement. Postmodernity for them (although some of this third
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category would not use the term) would entail a more radical delving into
modernity.
One can see how the postmodern framework might be compatible
with the four movements contributing instability to our world today.
Globalization has been a fragmenting, destabilizing force for many.
Among the majority poor of the world it often wrests away from them any
control they may have over their lives and livelihood. Among the wealthy,
people are inundated with choices, so that it is hard to think in any other
terms than small discrete elements sound bytes and to prefer the short-term
gain over the long-term haul and development. Migration heightens our
sense of difference. Difference in language and custom, especially in urban
areas where more than a hundred different ethnicities may be rubbing up
against each other, seems to be the very height of the postmodern. The
resurgence of religion has also meant the proliferation of new types of
religiousity either independent forms of Pentecostal and Charismatic faith,
or New Age syncretisms between Asian traditions and the West, homemade
forms of witchcraft in the West, and Neo-Hindu and Neo-Buddhist forms
of religion at home in Asian countries but in the West as well. Even within
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established traditions of Christianity such as Roman Catholicism and
Anglicanism we see the fragmentation caused by different ideologies or
changing social conceptions of things such as the ordination of gay persons
and the legitimating of gay marriage. Contending parties within churches
20
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can seem as heterogeneous as those without. And finally, terrorism itself is
about the strange, the other, the different, and the dangerous.
When seen even cursorily in this light, an inclination might be to say
that the postmodern framework is the most suitable one for understanding
these changing, often turbulent movements in our kinds of societies. Many
people self-consciously describe themselves as "postmodern," as living in
this fragmented, heterogeneous world where difference is prized in its very
difference. It is most common among elites who are able to survey the
difference around them. But it is also common among young adults who
have grown up in this blooming, buzzing reality and see it as the way to
survive and to thrive in an open-ending, ever-accelerating, always-changing
society. But it is not a useful term for the poor of the world, who do not
have the luxury of choice that postmodernity seems to provide, and for
whom further fragmentation may threaten their very survival.
Put succinctly, postmodernity is a useful way of describing the
difference, discontinuity, and fragmentation we are experiencing provided
that this difference, discontinuity, and fragmentation does not undermine a
basic sense of security and safety. It may be experienced as swirling around
us, but we still have our feet planted firmly on the ground. If that ground
beneath our feet is sensed as itself unstable, we are likely no longer to want
to exult in difference and discontinuity. This is what happens when one
finds oneself living amidst a war, in a failed state, and under direct threat of
global terrorism. Then difference and discontinuity is not seen as providing
more possibilities for choice, but rather as a threat to our survival. My
contention is that many people in wealthier parts of the world who once
saw postmodernity as enhancing their choices are now beginning to
experience postmodernity's consequences as threatening their existence.
Multiculturalism
"Multiculturalism"like its counterpart, postmodernity carries multiple
meanings. In the study of populations, it refers to people of many different
cultural backgrounds occupying the same space. Within that space, they
contend for recognition and respect, for goods and services, for power, and
for access to the meaning-making resources of society. This has been up to
the last few years a common meaning of the term. It is an
acknowledgement of the fact that globalization and migration have
changed our neighbourhoods and our cities.
It has another meaning, especially from the mid-1990s, a meaning used
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in a pejorative manner. It refers to the attempts to broaden the general
education curriculum in universities to include non-Western texts. At times
it has been used to decenter the educational syllabus altogether. To be
reading "dead white European males" was to be "Eurocentric" and hence
not "multicultural." Because of those "culture wars" fought in the 1990s,
multicultural has become a dirty word for those who wish to preserve the
European heritage. The Nobel laureate in Literature Saul Bellow summed
it up in these words: "When the Zulu produce a Tolstoy, I will read him."
These discussions and debates have subsided somewhat in academe, but the
miasma around the term "multicultural" lingers on.
Most recently, another pejorative use of the term has appeared.
"Multicultural" refers to failed government policies regarding the
integration of newcomers into (predominantly Western) societies.
Societies that welcomed newcomers with great tolerance, provided support
for maintaining cultural heritage (as does the Canadian government), and
generally encouraged cultural distinctiveness are now blamed for these
same newcomers not being integrated into the larger society. What
"integrated" means varies from place to place. In some instances, it means
that newcomers still do not speak the national language. In other instances,
it refers to their rejection of dominant culture values regarding equality of
women, freedom of choice, freedom of religion, and autonomy of
individuals within families. In yet other instances, it means the failure of
newcomers to take on citizenship in their adopted lands. In all of these
instances, those pointing to what they see as failure are now announcing
"multiculturalism is dead!" By that they mean that such cultural tolerance is
a failed policy that threatens the cohesion of the nation.
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Thus, when multiculturalism operates in stable circumstances, it can be
seen as enhancing the variety in our experience of life. In unstable
situations, on the other hand, the plurality of cultures bumping up against
one another becomes a sign for the unknown, even the dangerous
unknown. Toleration of difference becomes strained. If a genuine crisis
emerges, then the channels of communication between the different
groups may not be sufficient to bear the weight of information and feeling
needed, because those channels are not familiar and trusted pathways.
The End of Postmodernity and Multiculturalism?
As can be seen from even this brief overview of uses of the terms
postmodernity and multiculturalism, they both have captured important
aspects of the world we are now living in. The diversity, the fragmentation,
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and the acceleration of life all are given some meaning by appeal to
postmodernity. They are all factors that square uneasily with the optimism
of the high modern period. Multiculturalism was an attempt to name the
increasing plurality of our societies, without perhaps giving much further
description of the complex interplay. Some have tried to overcome the
limitations of multiculturalism by speaking of polyculturalism. I do not
know if switching from a Latin-based to a Greek-based prefix really moves
the debate along much.
In these lectures I am trying to suggest that, while postmodern and
multicultural may be useful descriptive terms for our experience when
things are stable and can go relatively unquestioned, they do very little to
interpret those experiences or to engage them constructively when we are
perceived to be moving into a crisis. The convergence of globalization,
migration, the resurgence of religion, and now the threat of global
terrorism have, together, given us a potent brew that makes the world seem
at great deal more unstable than has been the case in the recent past. The
Cold War certainly carried with it risk and uncertainty. But the lines of
demarcation between East and West, between communist and capitalist,
were more sharply drawn. The postmodern, by definition, lacks such
clarity. The sheer multiplication of cultures in a given place complicates the
matter further.
I think that terms such as the postmodern and multicultural served us
reasonably well in a time of relative stability or at least perceived stability.
That stability could be heard in the euphoric rhetoric after the fall of the
Berlin Wall and announcements of the "end of history." We are now in a
much more unstable time, especially in view of the threat of global
terrorism and ecological collapse. Ulrich Beck, the German sociologist
who first wrote about technological and ecological risk in the mid-1980s,
has returned again to that theme. The sense of indeterminate but real and
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uncontrollable risk now pervades social consciousness. One of the
consequences of this is much less tolerance of ambiguity. The language of
multiculturalism collapsed in the weeks about September 11, 2001. Instead
of celebrating diversity, the clarion cry was: "United we stand." People of
ethnic groups that looked to be Middle Eastern had to go out of their way to
prove their loyalty to the American ideals. In some instances, Muslim
institutions were attacked just because they were Muslim. Similarly, the
language of tolerance so long prized in Dutch society has disappeared in the
Netherlands since the political murders of Pim Fortuyn and Theo van
Gogh. In times of risk, an openness to the different and the unknown
becomes simply too dangerous.
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In the face of such threats to our security, the temptation is to move
toward a kind of default position (to use the language of information
technology) of self-defense. That is, an unexamined way of interpreting
things takes over, reshaping our thinking and reorienting our action. This
frame may represent our genuine feelings and fears, heretofore papered
over with the rhetoric of postmodernity and multiculturalism. Such
unexamined thinking does not serve us well. It attempts to shield us from
uncertain and unwanted intrusions into our world, but it does not engage
them in any significant way.
That is what is happening, I believe, in Western societies today, in the
anxiety over the long-term effects of globalization, continuing migration,
resurgent religion, and global terrorism. We know that, historically,
societies who perceive themselves to be under such threat are willing to
sacrifice their liberty to more authoritarian rule. If the perception of threat
becomes interwoven with a sense of being wronged or humiliated, it can
lead to forms of fascism and willingness to sacrifice those "others" in our
midst at any cost. The question then becomes: can we find a more adequate
framework for interpreting this unstable world that will lead to a better way
of living together on our planet, that will guide us in overcoming the
challenges facing us (rather than ignoring, denying or repressing them)?
These are the questions that animate this presentation and these lectures.
In the second of these lectures, I want to take up the question of such
frameworks. Can we find our way forward into a different kind of
modernity that will account for what we are experiencing in terms of
plurality, difference, contingency, and instability without engaging in
violence toward one another or creating fortress-like havens of safety
where people may survive for a time, but will not flourish? It is with this
question that we turn to the second lecture.
Seeking the Whole: From Fundamentalism to a Cosmopolitan
Worldview
The previous lecture looked at four factors that have made the world an
increasingly unstable place in the last decade and a half. Globalization,
migration, the resurgence of religion, and global terrorism have all
contributed to creating a very different kind of environment for human life
today. It was noted that two of the frameworks that were most frequently
used to interpret much of this were invocations of postmodernity and
multiculturalism. While these both had descriptive value, authenticating in
some way the sense of diversity, difference, fragmentation, and instability,
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they did not of themselves have much explanatory power to help us
interpret the world we live in, especially when that world became
fundamentally unstable. Nor did they suggest much by way of action to
address that instability, other than affirmation of those same experiences
they were intended to describe. And given the fact that the instability they
herald provokes anxiety, the response we do give may grow out of our worst
instincts rather than our best lights. We may well find ourselves falling back
into a "default" position that will not permit us to deal with these realities in
a creative fashion.
In this lecture, I would like to propose an interpretive framework that
will attempt to move us beyond relying on postmodernity and
multiculturalism as modes of response. This is, needless to say, a first and
tentative effort. The reality we are addressing here is complex. Nor can it
be worked out in sufficient detail within the short compass of these
lectures. My hope, however, is to give a first glimpse of a direction that
might be taken to move along the discussion of how we are to live in the
world that is taking shape around us.
My basic hypothesis is this: although Lyotard and others aligned with
some form of postmodernism have declared the "death of the grand
narrative" and even the "death of the subject," I think their claim is
overdrawn. To be sure, their consigning to the dustbin of history socially
shared narratives of whole societies that make overstretched claims is
probably well taken. The claims of the utter universality and triumph of
Western values over those of other societies does look like imperial
overreach. The confidence that reason can lead to socially engineered
utopias probably deserves the same fate. If the twentieth century was the
acme of high modernity, its far-reaching claims have much to answer for:
two world wars, genocides on new and terrifying scales, nuclear destruction,
and perhaps irreversible environmental degradation cannot be claimed as
triumphs for humankind. Certainly such grand narratives need to be
exposed for what they are.
But to move from there and say that no grand narrative is any more
possible goes a bit too far. If anything, global communications has made
commonly shared narrative more possible now than in the past. Think of
the rolling celebration of the millennium in the year 2000 from Kiribati
around the world to the mid-Pacific on our televisions. The mobilization
of sentiment through those same media, be it at the death of Diana,
Princess of Wales; the views on the Middle East from Al-Jezeera; or the
devastating effects of the 2004 tsunami in the Indian Ocean have created
shared narratives that were not possible before the information era. To be
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sure, viewers of these spectacles and reportage are not passive agents; they
can construct meaning at local levels that elude the control of the meaning
makers. One should more properly speak here of narrative flows, that is,
chains of locally constructed and transmitted narratives that are at once
mutually intelligible, yet reflect concrete circumstances in local
communities. Such flows have been in evidence in the social forces of
globalization since the mid-1990s, and are becoming more prevalent today.
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These flows may well represent as close as we may come to an explicitly
"universal"be it socially or in our theology in our complex and
interconnected times.
Similarly, how well people are able to adjust to constant and
thoroughgoing difference especially when it threatens identity and safety
cannot stand as an assumed and unexamined premise. Especially when the
transition is very rapid, most of us are likely to need help through this
period. Unlimited difference may work when other aspects of society are
secure, but when society itself appears under threat, our actions need to be
more deliberate, and we need a place to stand from which we can see the
bigger picture..
I would suggest, then, that in an unstable world, the response to the
heterogeneity, the difference, and the fragmentation of the postmodern
and to the relativist juxtaposition of the multicultural is not more of the
same becoming more postmodern and more relativist. To advocate this
strategy is not to take into account how people act under threat. To write
people off as being overly anxious or pathologically afraid is not a recipe for
an ordered society. That is precisely not a celebration of difference: it is,
rather, excluding people from the conversation. I think a more fruitful
approach is to posit that, we as human beings, are involved in a constant
searching for the whole, that is, an ongoing quest to take these disparate
experiences, sensations and idea, and craft them into patterns of
intelligibility. That intelligibility may be cognitive, moral, social, or aesthetic
or all of the above. The point is that we do not live in an utterly unordered
world. To do so would condemn us all to solipsism and silence. Unless we
can discern and delineate some of the patterning that is going on in this
bewildering variety of data, we give ourselves over to a Hobbesian world
where the strongest and those with most access to power will prevail.
The first reaction to such a proposal may be one of extreme caution.
Because we know what kind of unities or wholes were crafted out of the
chaos of the immediate past century. Varieties of totalitarian rule be it
fascist, communist, revanchist or what have you have been imposed by
strongmen upon a helpless population. To suggest such stirs resistance
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even in those who are the most critical of the Enlightenment. This is a set
of dangers for which we must remain vigilant. But fear, uncertainty and the
lack of security will drive even the most rational into postures they would
not have accepted of themselves in calmer times. Recent legislation
regarding immigrants and potential terrorists in different countries in
Europe, the United States, and Australia are evidence of this. To simply
turn our heads away, saying that we must do this because the world has
become too dangerous, will not eliminate the danger. As human beings, we
are symbol-makers, and we do not make them in isolation from one another.
It seems to me better to pay close attention as to how we try to construct a
sense of the whole rather than see it as a slippery slope that leads to
totalitarianism. If we are able to learn from history and from previous
reflection on great human failures, we have a better chance of constructing
something that will indeed serve the well-being of the human community.
In this lecture, then, I would like to begin by examining four such
attempts at seeking the whole that go astray. They are all modes that have
been engaged in by societies in recent times. To simply dismiss them as
pathologies fails to understand their attraction. To overcome them requires
comprehending the needs they address and the questions they answer. As
will be clear, I am not recommending any of them. But I recognize the kind
of lure they have had for some people.
Having done that, I will turn to an emerging model that is being
discussed principally in Great Britain and Germany today, that goes by
different names: reflexive modernity, new modernity, second modernity.
Here is where I think we have the best chance to overcome the misfires that
turn quests for the whole into new oppressive forms of totalitarianism.
In order to begin, however, there must be a few words about modernity
itself. Like postmodernity it is a slippery concept, one that cannot be
resolved here. What is offered is no more than a benchmark against which
to measure what will come after.
One View of Modernity
A good way to get some perspective on the elusive concept of
modernity is to step outside the North Atlantic, Western ambit, where
modernity was born and where its flame is kept most brightly burning. As
with secularization, there was once the view that the rest of the world would
follow in the path blazed by Europe, especially with the French and the
Scottish Enlightenments. Today, it is more common to speak of
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modernitie in the plural. They bear family resemblances and cans
communicate with one another, but are not carbon copies or (perhaps now
the more apposite metaphor) clones of one another.
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For such a view, I turn here to the Mexican critic Néstor García
Canclini, in his study of hybridity, modernity, and mixing. In looking at
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modernization from a Latin American perspective, he describes modernity
as the result of four interlocking projects.
The first emancipatinghe calls an project, wherein all aspects of life are
secularized, i.e., emancipated from ecclesiastical or political control. Social
life is rationalized and individualism becomes the norm, especially in urban
areas.
is an project, whereby society tries to gain powerThe second expansive
over nature as well as over the production and circulation of goods and
knowledge. Extending scientific knowledge and enhancement of profit
give this expansion an open horizon.
The third renovatingis a project, that insists on constant innovation to
elude sacred prescriptions and control, as well as constant renewal of the
sign value of things in society as their value and meaning is eroded by a
consumer mentality.
And finally, democratizingthere is a project that constantly tries to extend
all these other projects across all sectors of society for greater participation
and reinforcement of the modernizing enterprise as a whole.
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This combination of emancipation, expansion, renovation, and
democratization can provide a general framework for how modernity has
operated heretofore, in a variety of cultural contexts, as well as give us a
point of departure for how to think about a different kind of modernity in
the second half of this lecture. Before leaving this brief consideration,
however, it is important to note that, for most of the world, modernity does
not occupy a uniform space. Particularly in urban conglomerations outside
the Western world, people may be passing daily from premodern to modern
into postmodern settings. In the squatter settlements around Lagos, the
favelas barriosof Rio or São Paulo, the of Mexico City, those arriving from
the countryside try to reproduce their premodern villages in their new
locale, but go off to work (especially the women) in the modern or
postmodern sites of the city as domestic help or cleaning personnel, or
doing the delicate work of computer board construction. More could be
said about this different faces of modernity, but that is not our principal
purpose here. Let us turn to some of the attempts to find the whole that are
currently practiced, but fall short of the idea.
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Search for the Whole: Detours and Dead Ends
I would now like to sketch very briefly four such quests for the whole
that end short of the goal, and often very badly. They are: fundamentalism,
romanticism, universalism, and what I shall call "splitting." These last
attempts are presented as bulwarks against anomie. Each will be described
and, to the extent, possible, their allure identified and their point of
weakness examined.
Fundamentalism
Certainly the most talked about of these quests for the whole today is
fundamentalism. The term originates from struggles within conservative
Protestantism in Britain and the United States at the turn of the twentieth
century. At that time, a series of pamphlets circulated in the United States,
describing the "fundamentals" of Christian belief; hence the name. Today,
the term is used somewhat indiscriminately, especially by non-
conservatives, for any kind of conservative faith with which they disagree.
It is extended also beyond Christianity to include a wide range of Muslim
revival and reform movements, some forms of Judaism, and Hindu
communalism.
Despite numerous extended efforts to define and to map out the forms
of fundamentalism (notably the University of Chicago Project conducted
jointly with the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in the early 1990s),
there is still not any agreed upon definition of fundamentalism. The
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definition I have found most useful was developed by Bruce Lawrence.
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He sees fundamentalism first of all as a modern phenomenon. It arises in
modernity as a reaction against modernity. It establishes its sense of the
whole by lifting up elements from a religious tradition that are specifically
anti-modern in character, and then making them a boundary of identity that
separates off the true believer from the apostate and the infidel. Thus, in
early twentieth century Christianity, the five "fundamentals" were the literal
interpretation of Scripture, the virginal conception, the substitutionary
atonement of Christ's death, his bodily resurrection, and his physical return
at the end of timeall beliefs hard to reconcile with modernity. Other
Christan dogmas like the Trinity, for instance, are not included here.
Similarly, in contemporary Islam, the prescription for literal application
of the and the sequestering of women from the public sphere havesharia
nothing to do with what have long been considered the five pillars of Islam:
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the oneness of God, the duty to pray five times a day, giving alms,
maintaining the fast during the month of , and making theRamadan
pilgrimage to Mecca. Again, in asserting and the sequestration ofsharia
women, one sees a reaching for distinctively anti-modern elements to
bolster an anti-modern outlook, thereby striving to create a community that
will stand over against the corrosive acids of modernity.
The fundamentalist quest for the whole sees modernity as incapable of
ever fulfilling that dream, either because of the of its claims forhybris
science and technology, the immorality of its rank individualism, or its lack
of normative behaviour because of its being driven by consumption. Only
by creating a sectarian group, clearly bounded by anti-modern markers, can
one hope to live in integrity and wholeness within a tradition.
Fundamentalism comes in degrees, of course. But it is its adherence to the
explicitly anti-modern, and privileging those anti-modern elements of a
tradition over what might be considered the principal elements in other
settings, that gives it its attraction. In the confusion of a pluralist world, it
provides clarity, if not truth.
Romanticism
It was the late Sir Isaiah Berlin's studies in the early German and French
Romantics who proposed a Counter-Enlightenment view of the world, that
first alerted us to the power and destructive potential of this worldview.
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Starting with Johann Georg Hamann in Germany, a powerful reaction grew
against the universalizing tendencies of the Enlightenment. Rather than
stressing the general, the universal and the rational, Romanticism
emphasized the genius of the solitary individual who had special insight into
the nature of reality. Only by following uncompromisingly the true genius
could one arrive at beauty and the true which was not generalizable but
particular. The power of the unconscious to reveal this reality ultimately
supersedes what conscious rationality can attain. It is the Dionysian, not the
Apollonian path that leads to true reality.
Recently Richard Wolin has traced how this late eighteenth century and
nineteenth century strand of quest for the whole leads through Nietzsche to
right-wing movements in the twentieth century: the cult around the analytic
psychologist Carl Gustav Jung, and the German and French New Right
including some of the scions of postmodernism. Other strands flowing
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out of this cult of the personal and the irrational, and drawing in different
ways upon Nietzsche, are to be found in the philosophy of Martin
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Heidegger and in National Socialism. To be sure, these are not direct
genealogies; but the family resemblances are there. The irrational and the
poetic, the singular and the particular, the solitary genius are seen to triumph
over the pedestrian ministrations of the bureaucratic, the universal, and the
rational.
It goes without saying that this Romanticist strain in Western thought
has tried to create its senses of the whole, either in esoteric readings not
open to less discerning minds, or even in outright fascism, where violence is
seen as purgative of the banal and the impure. It creates its own kinds of
purity over against the hybridities of modernity. In emphasizing the
ineluctable, the pure, the particular, it develops an especially aesthetic
reading of the truth, which at times is counterintuitive to what otherwise
would be held as moral truth.
Universalism
If Romanticism, in its search for the whole, counters the central tenets
of the Enlightenment, and with it, modernity, then universalism is an
attempt to find the whole precisely in the very tenets of the Enlightenment.
The Western Enlightenment arose, as Stephen Toulmin has reminded us,
out of an effort to overcome the sectarian feuding of the churches in the
seventeenth century. The murderous outcome of holding in
uncompromising fashion of each to one's own dogma, thereby not allowing
any common ground where all parties could stand, but by insisting rather on
the irreducibility of one's own position to any other, can only lead to the
most powerful winning the day. Only when all accede to the rules of
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reason, common to all human beings, can such tribalism be overcome.
These powerful ideas did much to shape a new sense of the whole in their
French forms of rationality, and in their Scottish forms of polity and
economy. They appeared to free Europe from the rivalries of the churches
and the unchallenged authority of their hierarchs. Science, not religion,
would hold the day.
The confidence (some would say the ) of such a confidence inhybris
rationality helped free the powers of scientific and technological innovation
that religious authorities had to some extent held in check. It made the
technological and political progress of Western society possible. It also
helped move it into colonizing much of the rest of the world, where the
"benefits" of this Enlightenment civilization would then raise the
benighted peoples of the rest of the world from their darkness. Inasmuch
as any rational person could participate in this process, made this
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universalism in principle open to all, not merely to those who by birth or
rank would control the levers of power.
Much can be said for this quest for the whole. It dwells especially on
cognitive, scientific understandings of the truth that are, in principle,
accessible to all reasonable people. But it, too, has had its overreach,
notably in three areas.
First of all, it posits a single and sole rationality, without retrieving the
nuances of cultural difference. In its cruder nineteenth century forms
(echoed in Kant's and Hegel's comments about the irrationality of
Africans), it fails to understand that there are fundamentally different ways
of organizing the whole. This fact continues to plague Christian theology
today at a time when the majority of Christians live outside the Western
sphere, yet their own theology and efforts at inculturation are largely
ignored by the West.
Second, and in the most tragic instance, "sciences of society" were
devised in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries that have utterly crushed
individuals and cultural lifeways. The depredation of Marxism in its various
forms be it Stalinism, Maoism, or Maoism's offshoots in Peru, Cambodia,
and Nepal can hardly be seen by most as a new whole in which human life
flourishes.
Third, and perhaps less obviously (at least to some), the negative
dimensions of globalization its relentless innovation, its brutal competition,
its utter restlessness go hand in hand with this universalism and continue, in
Habermas' words, to colonize the lifeworld. Habermas himself has not
always been clear about the universalism of his ideal communicative
situation, in which all will be resolved by rational argument, might have
cultural and class biases. In recent years, he has accorded a greater role for
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religion itself even in these idea societies. Given that, one cannot foreclose
a judgment on just where all of that will end up. But it is noteworthy that
even the most rational of quests for the whole does not automatically yield
the desired human flourishing.
While such universalism might seem to be the single best candidate for
seeking the whole because of its democratic access, its universalized rules,
its shared criteria for evaluation of outcomes it too potentially falls short in
a complex, pluralistic world. Nonetheless, its distinctive advantages should
not be underestimated.
Splitting
A fourth way of seeking the whole I would call splitting. This entails
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splitting off the problematic parts of the perceived reality, and trying to
construct the whole out of what is left. The construction is then regarded
as a bulwark against the anomie that threatens a society because of its
complexity, pluralism, and conflicted situation.
Muslim scholar Bassam Tibi gives a useful example of how this is done
by some Muslims who face Western modernity, but find parts of that
modernity incompatible with their sense of Islam. He distinguishes
between and . Instituional modernity isinstitutional modernity cultural modernity
the modernity evident in the achievements of science and of technology. It
is based on a mathematicization of nature. This kind of modernity
Muslims can accept, as is evident by the number of Muslim immigrants to
North America who are engineers, physicians, chemists, and workers in the
natural sciences. This is the modernity created by the scientific worldview.
Cultural modernity, on the other hand, is problematic; for this grows
of the results of accepting values such as individual free will, the freedom to
change one's social or cultural environment, the acceptance of relativism as
a principle for dealing with pluralism. Such cultural modernity is rejected by
some Muslims. In other words, they live in the modern West as workers in
institutional modernity, but try to continue their lifeworld as opposed to
cultural modernity.
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This is not something that besets only Muslims. One finds it among
other religionists as well, including among Christians. The point here is the
attempt to wall off part of modernity and to live in a way that accepts only
parts of it. This is different from taking a critical stance toward aspects of
modernity; here we see an attempt to simply ignore or suppress a dimension
of it altogether.
Splitting happens in many other ways. One sees it in politics where one
is willing to ignore unpleasant aspects of a political programme in order to
embrace other, cherished values. This has been pointed out in a recent
study in the United States, where it was shown that some of the poorest
sectors of the United States consistently voted for the Republican Party
because of that party's commitment to "family values," even though that
same party's economic policies toward poor families actually harms them.
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Yet another way is found in nativist reassertions. Samuel Huntington
did this in 2004 with his controversial book, Who Are We? The Challenge to
America's National Identity. In that book, Huntington asserted that the
United States' identity is based in White Anglo-Saxon Protestant values, and
the influx of Latinos from the various countries of Central and South
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America (especially Mexico), constituted a threat to the nation. Similar
voices can be heard today in Germany, with the assertion of a national
Leitkultur or guiding culture that is under threat because of immigration.
"Germany is not a land of immigration ( )" is frequentlyZuwanderungsland
heard there. In these instances, reasserting a reified version of the national
culture is seen as a hedge against the complexity emerging because of the
entry of people whose cultures are fundamentally different.
Perhaps given the complexity of the world we live in, some such
splitting is difficult to avoid. Difficult choices have to be made. But to
simply cordon off attitudes or policies, rather than critically engage them,
seems to be short-circuiting, in the long run, the search for the whole.
A New Modernity
Given the fact that people are likely to continue to seek the whole that
this is something inherent to the meaning-making, symbolizing process that
makes us human beings. Are there strategies for creating a way of living in
the complex, plural realities we live in that can take into account the shifting
factors in our existence, that can deal with the instabilities that are created
without giving in to ways of seeking the whole that may be deeply flawed,
either morally or socially?
What I would like to sketch out here are some attempts that are being
made in that direction, that going beyond simply revelling in plurality (what
Canadian sociologist Reginald Bibby designated a number of years ago as
"mosaic madness” ) or a kind of Balkanized multiculturalism that collapses
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at the first sign of stress. It goes by a number of names, and is being
constructed especially by thinkers in Great Britain and in Germany. It was
initially called "reflexive modernity." Somewhat later, Scott Lash called it a
"second modernity." Most recently, Ulrich Beck has been calling it a "new
cosmopolitanism". Let us look at each of these names to explore how
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they are reading what needs to change in our perception of modernity.”
Reflexive modernity" refers to an attitude in our reading of modernity.
It is intended to convey that our experience of modernity is no longer
simply a phenomenological one, accepting the principles and promises of
modernity at face value. Rather, we take a reflective, even critical posture
toward it. For example, that progress and innovation are taken for granted
as defining features of modernity is no longer assumed. We have been
experiencing the limits of progress and innovation as values that can be
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accepted uncritically. This is most evident in debates about the
environment. Is drilling for oil in wildlife reserves to be accepted because
of the West's insatiable hunger for petroleum, even if it is a potential danger
to the environment? The threat of global terrorism likewise compels us not
take our security for granted any longer. Our sense of risk in general has
been heightened, be it for reasons of ecology, the volatility of financial
markets, the spread of communicable diseases such as SARS or avian flue.
Reflexive modernity, then, means that we experience reality increasingly at
one remove. We now question what we once took for granted.
"Second modernity" is an attempt to seek the whole, using the
framework of reflexive modernity. It reflects the fact that we have moved
beyond the first modernity, but are not mired in a fragmented
postmodernity. One of the features of a second modernity is a sense that
many of the boundaries that defined the first modernity have been shifted.
These shifts are sometimes experienced as a deterritorialization, that is,
boundaries which once defined and even protected us are no longer
fulfilling these functions. This is most evident in the experience of the
pluralization of our societies through migration. Not only are dominant
culture people confronted with a multiplicity of ethnic identities, the
situation has become such in some places that there is no ethnic majority
any more. That, for instance, is the case in Los Angeles, and becoming
increasingly so in other urban centres of immigration. Ecological threats in
the atmosphere be they the hole in the ozone layer or the cloud of smog
hanging over South Asia from the cooking fires know no national
boundaries. Thus boundaries that define identities are found to be shifting
as are those we thought once protected us. The United States thought it was
largely safe from global terrorism because of the expanse of two oceans on
its eastern and western frontiers. September 11 changed all of that.
Deterritorialization is experienced also in the fact that boundaries that
once defined purity are being replaced by concepts of mixing and hybridity.
As people migrate, mix, and marry racial identities become blurred. Jacques
Audinet has called this "the human face of globalization". To be of mixed
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race was through much of the nineteenth and twentieth century a sign of
being impure, even of weaker stock. But things are changing rapidly in this
regard. The golfer Tiger Woods has become an icon of this new hybridity:
not only drawing his identity from African and Asian resources, but also by
being the very opposite of a scion of a debilitated stock. He is the number
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one golfer in the world. , , creolization whatever it is calledMestizaje métissage
represents now a new and positive way of being in the world.
The second modernity not only forces us to rethink boundaries; it calls
forth new decisions. The debate about genetically modified crops, and the
divide between North America and Europe on this matter, represents one
set of such decisions to be made. The capacities of biotechnology to
prolong life have created another. The line between medicinal supplements
and doping in professional sports raises yet another. This second
modernity raises, therefore, a whole set of questions that must be addressed
now in a way that was not the case even in the immediate past.
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Finally, the most recent term introduced for this new modernity is
cosmopolitanism. This is of course an older term, usually intended to
convey the sense of being (as its etymology implies) a world citizen. It was
typically used of elite populations, who had the means to travel frequently,
and who as a result of this felt at home in many places in the world. In this
newer usage that older meaning is not denied, but has been supplemented in
two key ways. First of all, the new cosmopolitans are not so much an elite as
they are the mass of migrants moving around the world today. Some are
professionals and middle class, but the great majority of them are working
class people. They are cosmopolitan in their capacity to negotiate multiple
cultures, both in their current place of residence, their workplace, and their
country of origin, and in their use of communications media to hold all of
this together. Cultural critic Paul Gilroy sees them creating a new sense of
convivência, or capacity to live together and interact with the great deal of
difference that surrounds them. They do not experience cosmopolitan life
as tourists or sometime visitors, but as those who must encounter and
interact with difference every day of their lives. They do not have the luxury
of experiencing the different as exotic or romantic; it is part of their
ongoing struggle for survival.
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The other dimension of this new cosmopolitanism is that its thinking
and decision-making is increasingly characterized by a "both-and" rather
than an "either-or" approach. Modernity was marked by its capacity to
differentiate and make distinctions. That is, after all, a key aspect of critical
thinking. Confronted as it is with increasing plurality and complexity, the
new cosmopolitanism is more keenly aware of the need to capture that
sense of complexity in its decision-making. A simple differentiation is less
useful to explain phenomena in the world today. For example, the early
stages of globalization were often characterized as a homogenization of the
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world: global flows from the media would gradually erase differences and
we would all come to be more and more alike. Experience has shown,
however, that such is not entirely the case. While some things have become
more the same, the reaction against this homogenization has been new
emphases on the local. English may be becoming the universal language of
commerce and education in Europe, but this has also led to a revival of
many local languages such as Breton, Frisian, and Ladino that once were
considered doomed to extinction. Globalization has become, in the words
of Roland Robertson, "glocalization," a mixture of the global and the
local.
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It is this "both-and" attitude that is most characteristic of the new
cosmopolitanism. Ways need to be found to incorporate the plurality we
experience into our decision-making, our policies, and our ways of life, and
taking an inclusive, rather than an exclusive, attitude is a major way of doing
this.
Conclusion: A Second Modernity
What I have tried to outline in this lecture is how terms like
postmodernity and multiculturalism have become less useful, especially for
any analysis of the world we live in today. They both pointed to important
dimensions of contemporary experience: a sense of pluralization, of
fragmentation, of irreducible difference. Both terms did describe for a
time these aspects of our existence. But we can now see they were best
suited to a relatively stable set of social conditions. One can revel in
plurality and fragmentation when one feels secure that the larger world will
hold together without any great effort on our part. One can celebrate
cultural diversity when encounter with those cultures is a choice or an exotic
excursion to an ethnic restaurant. But the instability of the last years has
shown that these concepts are not resilient when put to the test. People
quickly seek a new whole when they cannot presume that the erstwhile
arrangements are going to stay in place. The rhetoric of multiculturalism
has collapsed under social stress in a number of countries today. People
need some sense of the whole in order to know how to navigate a crowded
and confused world. In the words of Reginald Bibby, they need
frameworks for moral and social judgements.
I examined briefly four such quests for the whole that mark the current
landscape of our world. Fundamentalism, Romanticism, Universalism,
and splitting present a series of options for such quests for the whole. Each
has certain advantages, but often also glaring disadvantages that do not
address the complexities of our time.
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Because of those shortcomings, I suggested a look at a new viewing of
modernity, that is increasingly being called a second or new modernity. It is
marked first of all by a reflexivity that has tried to learn from the
shortcomings of high modernity, with its sometimes overweening self-
confidence, its unexamined belief in innovation and progress, its tendency
to believe in the efficacy of its utopian social engineering. Secondly, it is
aware that boundaries that had provided relatively stable identities and
becoming more porous and are being redrawn. Some boundaries that we
thought would protect us are disappearing altogether and creating new
senses of risk. Thirdly, as a result of these shifting, porous and
disappearing boundaries, older concepts of purity are being replaced by
sense of mixing and hybridity. Where once multiracial identity was seen as
debilitating (especially by Europeans), such hybridity today means
resilience and capacity to survive and even flourish in pluralistic and
difficult circumstances. The capacity to see the positive dimensions in such
mixing creates also the possibility of a new , a capacity for anconvivência
engaged living together amidst, and indeed with, people and identities that
are quite different. Fourth, these aspects of reflexivity, shifting boundaries,
and hybridity call forth a new cosmopolitan view of the world that tries to
encompass and interconnect the various dimensions of this complex
world. This view recognizes that, if left to itself, a pluralized, complex
world will seek the whole in ways that might become pathological and
detrimental to the well-being of society. It realizes that decisions will have
to be made, that moral and social judgements cannot be suspended or
postponed indefinitely.
Let me conclude by returning to the four major features that have been
creating instability in the world, and look at them briefly through the lens of
a second modernity.
Globalization.
The interconnectedness of communication and the global flows that
such communication creates will continue to be with us, barring a political
cataclysm that pulls countries back, fortress-like, behind high walls. But a
second modernity realizes that there is no "invisible hand" guiding
globalization and making it socially responsive. More and more in the
coming years, multilateral ways will have to be found to see that
globalization does not collapse under its own excesses. Recent concern
43
about Africa among some of the developed countries is a heartening
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example of this.
Migration.
Migration is likely to continue as long as there is economic inequity and
political instability in the world. It is creating multicultural societies that will
have to find more explicit ways of negotiating difference, of promoting
cultural interaction, and of continuing to seek what will bind all of this
together in some kind of a whole. The crisis now surfacing in a number of
European countries (and also in Australia) is indicative of this need. A
second modernity realizes that the question is not we will bewhether
multicultural; it is, rather, we will be multicultural. Here new patterns ofhow
engagement, and a logic of "both-and" will likely be part of the response.
Resurgence of Religion.
The resurgence of religion has called into question secularization as
the sole paradigm for dealing with diversity, or at least is prompting a critical
review. That religion is resurgent at a time of instability is itself evidence of
one of the quests of searching for the wholeeither as fundamentalism or in
revival movements. Simply to try to re-privatize religion is not an option.
The question is rather how to encourage the positive dimensions of religion
for the sake of a second modernity, and how to curb those totalizing
tendencies that threaten the well-being of others. I will be returning to this
in the third lecture.
Global Terrorism.
Global terrorism is not likely to go away any time soon. Large groups
of unemployed, disaffected males will provide a steady demographic
stream into its ranks for at least the next thirty years. Reducing the
conditions that feed and sustain the turn to terrorismpoverty, humiliation, a
sense of powerlessnesswill reduce its attractiveness. The "both-and"
thinking of a second modernity is likely to provide better intermediate
resolutions than ever greater disjunctive policies and discriminating
practices against certain populations.
The prospect of a second modernity is only now being sketched out.
But it seems likely to provide some direction in dealing with the complexity
and the instability of the world as we are experiencing it. The question now
comes: how do we as Christian believers direct the resources of our faith to
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this kind of world? That will be the subject of the final lecture.
The Second Modernity and a New Catholicity
The first two lectures have dealt with what it means to live in the
unstable world we are now experiencing. It has tried to locate some of the
principal sources of that instability, and to look at the possible critical and
analytical frameworks that might be used to address them. In this final
lecture, I want to turn to the resources of faith, especially Christian faith, to
engage and address these challenges that lie ahead.
I have suggested that the framework that might best describe our
situation and direct our response is what is being called a "second
modernity." This second modernity has a reflexive or critical relationship
with the first modernity, and recognizes how things have become more
complex, how boundaries and identities are changing, how we have to
consider plurality in make-up of identities, and how a more cosmopolitan
worldview will serve us better in the years ahead.
How might our faith provide an adequate and engaged response to the
new modernity? If the Second Vatican Council, whose fortieth anniversary
we are celebrating this year, helped give contour to living in the first
modernity, how might we seek out our responses for living in a second
modernity?
The Role of Religion in International Politics
The Second Vatican Council, especially in its Pastoral Constitution on
the Church in the Modern World, , charted out a trajectoryGaudium et spes
into modernity that has served us quite well. Its commitment to the
fundamental goodness of the world, its recognition of the centrality of the
concept of culture in shaping human and social life, and its valuing of
human agency or activity for the sake of that world are ideas that will
continue to guide us. At the same time, no doubt inevitably, the world has
continued to change. Globalization was still an unknown concept for most
people in the 1960s. No one would have imagined the urbanization and the
extent of migration that we now experience nearly a half-century later, nor
the profound pluralism of our societies as a consequence of this. The
international religious issues at the time of the Council were atheism and
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secularization. Today, as we have seen, there is a resurgence of religious
feeling in the world.
We have already talked about some of these features thus far in these
lectures. I would like to take as a point of departure for this final lecture the
role religion can play in the world as it is developing, and some of the
potential things that religion can contribute on the international scene
today. It was already noted that religion now intrudes into international
politics and studies of international relations in a way unimagined only a
short time ago, because of a renewed interest in religion, and its own
resilience. Scholars working in these areas are struggling to come up with
models that give an appropriate place to religion in these settings.
Richard Falk has been one of the leading figures in this regard. In a
work on the role of religion in creating a more humane model of
governance on the international scene, he has made some brief suggestions
about a number of potential contributions religion can make to this
important area. Let me enumerate them here as a way of beginning this
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reflection:
1. An appreciation of suffering, and a commitment to lift up people in
society who are suffering.
2. The mobilizing potential of religion and its resonance with the deep
roots of a society.
3. An ethos of solidarity, especially when religion shows its inclusivist
face.
4. Normative horizons that affirm humanity even in the midst of
fragmentation and diversity.
5. The transformative nature of faith and ideals, particularly as they are
related to struggle and self-sacrifice.
6. A sense of limits, growing out of an awareness of finitude and the
capacity of human beings for evil.
7. A sense of identity that is not achieved by subjection to the state, but
rather in reference to a spiritual journey, making of the "citizen" a
"citizen pilgrim."
8. A sense of reconciliation that recognizes human limits, and the need
for forgiveness and the beginning of life again after conflict and
catastrophe.
These eight points stake out a considerable agenda for faith as it faces a
second modernity. I would like to combine them somewhat and focus on
four areas where Christian faith might make a contribution to living in the
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second modernity, of believing in an unstable world.
Suffering
Suffering is theological category that does not get much attention in the
developed world. It is a reminder of the finitude and shortcomings of
human existence, and of the oppression and injustice that the developed
world either imposes on the poor two-thirds world or acquiesces to in order
not to be disturbed.
Yet suffering is the lot of much of the world's population today, either
suffering caused by poverty, malnutrition, and disease, or the suffering
caused by civil conflict, political oppression, and a variety of forms of
racism and xenophobia. The theologian Edward Schillebeeckx speaks of
the "ecumene of suffering," the widespread, pervasive character of
suffering that marks the world today. Suffering can be reduced, but not
entirely eradicated. Its causes are at times too complex to admit of simple
solution. The fact that it cannot be completely eradicated reminds us of the
hybris that haunts some of our enterprises. It recalls to our minds that
margin that we cannot control.
But more importantly, suffering calls to respond to the things we can
indeed change, the suffering that is propped up and sustained by human
sinfulness, by greed and injustice, by pride and by power. The call to justice
has again echoed loudly in Catholic Social Teaching, especially since the
Bishops' Synod on Justice in 1970. The quest for justice will continue to be
central to the Christian agenda. Within the context of the second
modernity, we are called upon to refocus our sense of justice, in order to
create workable goals for eradication of certain kinds of suffering. There
are forms of suffering, such as malnutrition and disease, that can be directly
and effectively addressed by more effective food production and medical
distribution systems. There are other forms, such as racism and
xenophobia, that will require education especially to combat. Advocacy,
using international forums and the means of modern communication, are
already finding new avenues of effectiveness.
Reflecting on the meaning of suffering in no way legitimates it. But we
need to come to understand better how it is that so many people who suffer
manage not to lose their humanity in the process. What resources of the
human spirit are called forth in the best of human beings that can take even
the destructive trajectories of suffering and turn them into a source of an
expanding and even transcending human spirit? What happened to
someone like Nelson Mandela in all those years of imprisonment on
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Robben Island that produced not a man bent on revenge and retaliation, but
one of the great statesmen of the close of the twentieth century? What
lessons can be learned from his life to help oppressed people elsewhere?
What did Mother Teresa learn from living among those dying people who
had been abandoned by society, what did she learn about faithfulness,
abiding presence, and care that has gone on to inspire so many people
around the world? Spiritual guides have often spoken of the "school of
suffering," a trying discipline that strips us of our illusions, makes us adhere
to what is central and fundamental, and steadies our hand in unstable,
unsteady times. To learn from suffering is not to condone it; it is, rather, an
attempt to harness its awesome power to a nobler calling and broader
spiritual horizon. Christian faith in the second modernity must face the
reality of suffering more squarely. It must not avert its eyes from suffering's
searching gaze. It must bring to it the wisdom of the cross, that central
symbol in Christian faith that makes us rethink power and recipes for
success.
Indeed, all the great religious traditions of the world have reflections
on suffering. How can these be brought to bear on the suffering people
experience today, not as a palliative, but as a means of strengthening the
human spirit in its struggle to overcome suffering, and for the sake of
recognizing the nobility that sometimes emerges in suffering rather than
seeking ways for ourselves to insulate our lives from it?
Mobilization and Solidarity
One of the features that mark the resurgence of religion in the world is
its capacity to mobilize energies and to create bonds of solidarity. Pope
John Paul II, in his many trips to different parts of the world, has exhibited
again and again this mobilizing power of faith. Because faith makes an
appeal not only to transcendent realities but also has what Richard Falk calls
"civilizational resonance," it can draw the different strands of narrative in a
society together into a greater sense of the whole. In the recent debates
about whether to make inclusion of references to God and to Christianity in
the European Union Constitution, EU leaders worked studiously to avoid
recourse to religious references. At the same time, as the sense of
multiculturalism was collapsing in those same countries, the possibility of a
religious "grand narrative" was unavoidable: the religious face of Islam and
of many of the African immigrants to those countries reminded an older
Europe of its religious heritage.
Reference to religion can be divisive, but it can also mobilize solidarity.
When Bosnia and Herzegovina were invaded by the Serbs in the early 1990s,
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the leaders of the three major religious traditions (Roman Catholic,
Orthodox, and Muslim) all spoke out against the invasion and the war. Yet
none of the voices was strong enough to be heard outside its own
community, and sometimes was feeble even within them. After the war,
those leaders committed themselves to forming an interreligious council.
In the last years of the 1990s, they met publicly, sometimes as often as
biweekly, in order to impress upon the public consciousness that they were
acting together. In this way, they hope to be prepared should another war
come to their country.
The centennial celebration of the 1893 Parliament of the World's
Religions, held again in Chicago in 1993, has created an ongoing
organizationthe Council for a Parliament of the World's Religionsthat has
sponsored parliaments in Capetown in 1998 and in Barcelona in 2004.
Besides bringing religionists of all kinds together, each of these parliaments
has provided a forum for religious leaders to address together some of the
world's most pressing problems. These landmark events of religious
cooperation show the potential of religion for making the world a better
place.Much is being written about religion's collusionwittingly or
unwittinglywith violence, and for the sake of a better world those collusions
need to be uncovered and eradicated. But perhaps the best long-term
antidote to such conspiracy is linking the religions together for the sake of
good. In so doing, the potential for creating new bonds of solidarity for the
sake of the betterment of humankind can help point the rest of the world
toward ways of redefining the boundaries that separate rich and poor, the
powerful from the powerless, and the races of humankind. The term
"solidarity" first arose in the trade union movements of the nineteenth
century. Pope John Paul II has made it very much part of the vocabulary of
Catholic Social Teaching. In a second modernity, as boundaries shift and
are redefined, we must find new ways to bring people together as well. The
affective bonds of faith are certainly among the strongest that may be able
to do that.
Forming Identities in a Second Modernity
The complexity created by globalization and migration has put
identities under greater stress. One of the things that a second modernity
stresses about identities is similar to its understanding of the concept of
culture. In modernity, culture was often seen as a reified, definable entity
that was relative stable and enduring through time. It had its roots in Johann
Gottfried Herder's definition of culture from the eighteenth century: that
culture was a union of three things: language, custom, and territory.
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Migration and globalization has deterritorialized culture. The media have
undermined any defining custom, and have creolised language. Culture is
much more a negotiated reality now, having a certain historical core, but
constantly in conversation with forces all around it. What happens to a
migrant's culture over the span of the first two to three generations in a new
setting has been the object of much study. Culture is now seen more as a
kind of force field in which identities are negotiated.
To say this does not make culture or any constructed identity utterly
pliable or arbitrary. It is, however, to recognize that culture and identity are
never utterly stable. They are living entities that react to and change in the
midst of all kinds of stimuli.
For that reason, it may not be useful to think of identity as an entity or
reified lump of stuff. It might better be seen as the intersection point of
multiple relationships. Rather than thinking of identity as an isolate or
independent entity, it might better be viewed as an interdependent reality
that is greater than the sum of all its parts. An identity is not dependent
upon a single relationship; rather, it gets its resilience from its capacity to
identify with a whole range of relationships. One of the basic principles of
convivência is to have people in many different sets of relationships, so as to
avoid identifying solely with one single such set. Identities today have to be
capable of functioning amid many cultural realities.
Religion plays a significant role in this. It has already been noted that
religion is one of the most salient strands of identity in a migrant's life:
migrants often become more religiously attuned in their new country than
they were in their homeland. This seems to be so because religion provides
a connecting and familiar bond in an otherwise strange world. The great
religious traditions such as Islam, Christianity, Buddhism and others have
the additional quality of creating solidarity among peoples who are
otherwise so different. The experience of a papal audience in St. Peter's
Square in Rome, or of the in Mecca can give one of the sensation ofhajj
being one with a greater humanity. Those transethnic, transnational
identities are important building blocks for creating a different kind of
human community for the future. The calling on those principles to create
genuine (as Roman Catholics would call it) or a worldwidecommunio ummah
(as Muslims would call it) would be a powerful antidote to the xenophobia,
the racism, and the forms of prejudice that still mark the human family.
To see identity as a series of relationships, to see religion as providing
both face-to-face community, as well as a transcendental allegiance, is an
example of the cosmopolitan "both-and" that is a hallmark of the second
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modernity. As Falk pointed out, in that transcendental allegiance, life and
human community can also be seen as a pilgrimage or spiritual journey.
This helps create a critical distance from kinds of nationalist loyalties that
harden boundaries between people and create obstacles in communication.
"We have here no lasting city," as the Letter to the Hebrews reminds us
(13:14). While this can be viewed as playing down citizenship and the
commitments that flow from it, it should be read rather as not engaging in
idolatrous behaviourascribing divine meaning to a human institution.
Religion, it seems to me, can help balance the quest for identity between a
static, immobile sense of self and an arbitrary, unstable anomie. It can help
maintain flexibility but within the context of direction, moral grounding,
and normative horizons.
Reconciliation and Forgiveness
Since the time of the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, there has been a
dramatic growth in interest in reconciliation and the possibilities of
forgiveness. Some of this has come from a heightened awareness of the
amount of destructive conflict that has happened in the last decade and a
half. But it has also arisen from an admission of the profound damage that
colonialism has done to indigenous peoples around the world, and how
their cultures and personal lives were often wrecked by the advance of
European settlers. The upheavals and social conflicts that have uprooted
more than a hundred million people worldwide to create ongoing camps of
displaced persons and flows of refugees into other countries has made
people yearn for peace and repair from such disastrous occurrences.
The idea of reconciliation has been at the forefront especially of
Christianity and increasingly Islam during this period. Caritas
Internationalis, the umbrella organization for 164 relief and development
agencies in the Roman Catholic Church, has been working since 1995 to
build and implement training programmes in reconciliation in its member
organizations. To date thousands of people have been trained on all six
continents to engage in this work. In its current phase, it is working
especially with its counterparts in the Muslim world to collaborate in this
work of reconstruction and peace.
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It has been noted that these religions dare to believe in reconciliation
and andforgiveness, in justice living together. My own involvement in this
work has convinced me that it helps to have a religious, even eschatological
vision of reconciliation. Reconciliation is not an extrapolation from
cessation of conflict to some point of living together. To create the
conditions for reconciliation, one has to have what John Paul Lederach, a
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leading practitioner in the transformation of conflict, calls a "moral
imagination".
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Reconciliation is more than finding the right strategies or techniques to
end conflict. It is built on a sense of humanity as a peaceable existence, a
sensitivity to securing and sustaining justice, and a capacity to imagine those
rituals and other practices that will ground such peace and celebrate it
regularly.
As Desmond Tutu put it so eloquently in his memoir of South Africa's
Truth and Reconciliation Commission, there is "no future without
forgiveness". Without embarking on forgiveness, we remember too much
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and forget too little. As the narratives of a society are reconstructed in the
forgiveness process, there has to be a capacity to see wrongdoers in a new
lightnot just as malevolent beings bent on our destruction, but as
vulnerable, finite, even broken human beings acting out of a jumble of
emotions and motivations. Forgiveness is the creation of a space for a
different kind of future. The religious capacity to envision both
reconciliation and forgiveness creates the conditions for the development
of a genuinely new and renewed society. This possibility is crucial for a
second modernity, as it tries to negotiate its way between destructive pasts
and complex present situations.
The Two Pillars for a Theological Vision
In order to bring especially Christian faith into engagement with the
second modernity, two areas of theology will need closer attention. One is
the area of theological anthropology. The other is our sense of Christian
faith itselfwhat I have called a "new Catholicity."
It could be argued that Christology was the key area for systematic
theology in the last quarter of the twentieth century. This period coincided
with what has been called the "third quest of the historical Jesus." During
that period the social study of the New Testament, with its use of
contemporary sociological and anthropological methods, helped bring to
life the Gospel stories about the life and ministry of Jesus in a new way. It
was also the period when an emerging questionthe relation of Christian
claims about Jesus to the other great world religionsreached a new height of
attention.
It has been my contention that the major area for theological reflection
for the first quarter of the twenty-first century will be theological
anthropology, our theological understanding of what it means to be
human. In doing so, theological anthropology will need to move beyond
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the "anthropocentric turn" that marked theology at the turn of the
twentieth century, as cosmocentric views of creation made way for
anthropocentric ones. Certainly the looming ecological crisis has made a
solely anthropocentric view of the world obsolete and even dangerous. But
there are a number of other reasons that have made a return to a theological
anthropology more urgent.
One of these is the presence of biomedical technologies that have
complicated the boundary between human and non-human life. The
prospects of cloning, of continuance of life by technological means, and
advances in cognitive science have all raised questions about the human that
were not even thinkable a few decades ago. Here in the second modernity,
boundaries are being redefined with great rapidity. We must constantly be
thinking about how these affect our sense of the human.
Second, the development of concerns about human rights, the forms of
racism that globalization have created alongside the intractable historical
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forms we have inherited from colonialism, the slave trade, and the racist
ideologies of the nineteenth century all call us to expand what is included
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in the topic of theological anthropology. How identities are formed and
how we will live together with all our difference yet find means of social
cohesion constitute challenges to theological anthropology.
Third, our capacity to move beyond the anthropocentrism that shaped
much of twentieth century theological anthropology is crucial. To be sure,
this anthropocentrism was experienced at the time as liberating from
ecclesiastical and social strictures, but our continued survival is based on
learning our proper place within the world and all its systems. As ecological
theologies move into greater maturitybeyond lists of desiderata into
carefully constructed new anthropologiestheological anthropology as a
whole will benefit from this.
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Fourth, the ways that new social cohesion, through solidarity and
convivência, is theologically grounded will be an important part of how we
talk about human community. As has been noted, the second modernity
will have to find ways for greater engagement and cohesion between groups
that are different. To invoke simply the beauty of difference when societies
are under stress will not be effective. An intercultural hermeneutics is an
important dimension of interpreting these communities to one another.
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The other theological concept that will be important to the Christian
theological interpretation of this vision is what I have called elsewhere a
"new Catholicity". Let me remind us here of the three dimensions that I
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saw as central to this new Catholicity.
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The first two have long been seen as constitutive of catholicity as a
descriptor of the Church. The first was the universal extension of the
Church throughout the world (catholicity in its etymological sense). While
such worldwide extension is even more true today, in the twenty-first
century, than it was through much of the Church's history, that "seeking of
the whole" of the Church today will have to include aspects that have been
discussed here as part of the second modernity: a cosmopolitan, rather than
an ethnocentric view of humanity and human cultures; ways of including a
sense of the "both-and" view of reality rather than the more familiar
"either-or" attitude that has shaped much of our history; and ways to extend
our sense of to include a of peoples, where difference iscommunio convivência
not only recognized, but engaged.
The second was the fullness of faith. Not only must the faith handed
down to us from the apostles be maintained in all its integrity, we may wish
to emphasize within that faith elements that will keep us attuned to the
fullness of humanity that must receive this fullness of faith. I would
suggest two themes here.
The first is to bring together more closely the long Catholic tradition of
natural law with the newer worldwide emphasis on human rights. In many
ways this is what efforts at the global ethic are trying to do across religious
lines. How these might be brought together should be high on the
theological agenda.
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The second is to continue to explore the theme of reconciliation, both for
its Christian theological resources, and also for how it can link with those
theological resources from other religious traditions. Here is one of the
places where religious traditions can collaborate most fruitfully.
The third dimension of the new Catholicity is communication. It
should be clear from what has been said in these lectures that
communication efficacious speech, constructive listening, and creating the
speech environment where all of this can happenis going to be essential for
the well being of the human family in all of its complexity. For the
constructive engagement of cultural communities, patterns of
communication and interpretation will have to be strengthened. Ways to
keep all the groups in the conversation will need to be found in order to do
this. An effective pedagogy of listening within the Church itself will be one
of the important ways of modelling this for the larger society. The Roman
Catholic Church is the largest transnational, multicultural organization in
the world. If it can translate its theology of catholicity into ways of creating
this engagement, it will be doing incomparable service to humanity.
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The possibility of embarking on a new, or second modernity is the
challenge before us. We must find more effective ways of analyzing our
world if we are to be able to live together in the shrunken space and time of
globalization, in the convergence of peoples in migration, amid new ways
of living and believing in an unstable world. I would like to conclude here
with a passage from the Letter to the Ephesians, since it embodies to my
mind the vision that can animate this quest for a new way of seeking the
whole:
So you are no longer aliens or foreign visitors; you are fellow-
citizens with the holy people of God and part of God's
household. You are built upon the foundations of the apostles
and prophets, and Jesus Christ himself is the cornerstone.
Every structure knit together in him grows into a holy temple
in the Lord; and you too, in him, are being built up into a
dwelling place of God in the Spirit.
(Eph 2:19-22; )New Jerusalem Bible
No longer aliens and strangers; citizens in a common household of
God; built upon firm foundations; anchored by Christ as the cornerstone;
knit together as a holy temple, a dwelling place of God in the Spirit: that
strikes me as the visionary agenda for the Church in a second, a new
modernity.
R. Schreiter C.P.P.S
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